















Trade Policy Formation when Geography Matters for Specialisation 
 














UCD SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS 
UNIVERSITY COLLEGE DUBLIN 













School of Economics, University College Dublin and
Paris-Jourdan Sciences Économiques.
Abstract
In this paper, trade policy formation is incorporated into an
economic geography model. The political setup used is a modi-
…ed version of that introduced by Grossman and Helpman (1994)
in which policy makers may be in‡uenced by lobbying contribu-
tions. On the basis of the underlying trade framework, lobbying
activity is performed in bene…t of capital interests. Optimal pol-
icy outcomes indicate that the largest countries and countries
that are disadvantaged by trade regulation favour trade liberal-
isation. Moreover, the optimal domestic policy is more open to
trade when the local and global competition facing domestic …rms
is less …erce, the welfare dependency on manufacturing imports
is larger and when there is a more intense preference for variety
in consumption. It is shown that lobbying in‡uence on policy is
increasing in the concentration of capital ownership in the popula-
tion. It is also revealed that, in the cases when domestic special
and general interests do not coincide, lobbying activity is per-
formed to liberalise trade. In addition, this actually implies that
the presence of lobbying in‡uence on policy raises the long-run
national welfare. JEL classi…cation: D72, F12, F13 Keywords:
Economic Geography, International Specialisation, National Wel-
fare, Lobbying Contributions, Market Access Reciprocity
11I n t r o d u c t i o n
In world trade today, many factors a¤ect a country’s trade policy posi-
tion as policy makers need to consider both foreign policy responses and
the domestic voter response to domestic policy. In particular, short-run
policy consequences in the form of foreign retaliation and political pop-
ularity e¤ects in‡uence the domestic policy outcome no matter whether
policy makers act on national welfare-maximising motives or political-
economy incentives. The endogenous trade policy literature have iden-
ti…ed these factors for traditional trade settings, but no attempt has
previously been made to formalise trade policy formation in a trade
model where geography matters for international specialisation in the
sense that the trade and production pattern depends on national asym-
m e t r i e si nm a r k e ts i z e sa n dt r a d ec o s t s .T h ef a c tt h a tm a n ys t u d i e sh a v e
provided empirical support of that geography does matter for specialisa-
tion suggests that determinants of trade policy in an economic geography
model also plays a role in trade policy formation in practice.1 The main
purpose and contribution of this paper is therefore to formalise trade
p o l i c yf o r m a t i o ni na ne c o n o m i cg e o g r a p h ym o d e l .
The economic geography model used in this paper is a version of
the so-called footloose capital model, in which the specialisation pat-
tern depends on national market size and trade cost asymmetries and
the long-run production pattern is sustained by international …rm move-
ments and capital ‡ows.2 This model is chosen because, in comparison
with the alternative international economic geography model provided
by Krugman and Venables (1995), it can be solved analytically. The
version of the model used in this paper is provided in Baldwin and
Robert-Nicoud (2000) since it facilitates trade policy analysis. Further-
more, the political setup is speci…ed by a lobbying contributions model
in which an incumbent government that chooses policy on the basis of
welfare considerations also may be in‡uenced by lobbying activity. The
political process is formalised as a modi…ed version of the setup used by
Grossman and Helpman (1994). In order to comply with the economic
geography framework in which there is one speci…c factor of production,
the political setup is simpli…ed so that one lobbying group may in‡uence
the government. In the policy formation process, agents are assumed to
act on short-run incentives, so that the voter support of incumbents
1Recent empirical economic geography research are provided by Davis and Wein-
stein (2003) and Redding and Venables (2004). For a survey on earlier contributions
on the topic, see Overman, Redding and Venables (2003).
2See Baldwin et al. (2003) for a thorough exposition of the footloose capital
model, which stems from Martin and Rogers (1995).
2are based on short-run policy e¤ects on aggregate welfare and lobbying
group members want to in‡uence policy to raise short-run rents. In po-
litical science, a large literature provides support of the assumption that
voters are short-sighted and that the voter support of incumbents rely
on the current state of the economy (which in our model is captured
by aggregate welfare).3 In addition, the short-sightedness of lobbying
group members is due to the fact that only short-run gains can be gen-
erated from lobbying activity (since long-run factor returns are equalised
across countries). The political equilibrium is established in the short
run, which is coherent with empirical endogenous trade policy studies
showing that policy implementation bene…ts factors with incomes tied
to a particular production in the short-run.4
In the economic geography framework, a country with an active man-
ufactures sector has to be large enough to have a non-negligable market
size. This implies that we cannot rely on the small country assumption
as is standard in the endogenous trade policy literature. Indeed, the do-
mestic relative market size can a¤ect the domestic policy outcome only if
the home country has a non-negligable market size. To take trade-policy
interactions into account while remaining focused on the domestic polit-
ical equilibrium, trade policy implementation is assumed to be governed
by a market access rule. We …nd this assumption reasonable since this
rule is one of the main policy regulations governing multilateral trade
negotiations within the World Trade Organisation (and the former Gen-
eral Agreements on Tari¤s and Trade organisation).5 Intuitively, the
domestic equilibrium policy outcome derived under this assumption cor-
responds to the position that the home country brings to the table in
trade negotiations.
This paper is related to three main strands of research. First, it
provides a contribution to the endogenous trade policy literature and,
within this literature, it is closely related to Fisher and Serra (1996).
They use a median-voter approach to establish a country’s choice be-
tween autarky and free trade in a new trade setting. Their main …nding
is that a rich country accepts trade with rich or poor trade partners
while it rejects trade with middle-income countries. Similar to their
3This literature was founded by Downs (1957) and Key (1966). For a recent
survey, see Nannestad and Paldam (1994).
4See, for example, the surveys by Hillman (1989), Rodrik (1995) and Gawande
and Krishna (2003).
5In addition, the most favoured nation rule, which is the other main policy reg-
ulation within the multilateral trade negotiation system, is trivially ful…lled in our
two-country model of the home country’s trade vis-à-vis the rest of the world.
3analysis, we identify a country’s trade policy position in a trade setting
where production is characterised by economies of scale and monopolis-
tic competition. The fact that this is done in an economic geography
model however places the role of incremental trade costs in focus and
thereby enables the derivation of the endogenous trade policy level as
a function of trade-related factors. In addition, it is a well-established
fact in the endogenous trade policy literature that trade policies are used
as income-redistributive measures in bene…t of special interests. Trade
policy outcomes identi…ed on the basis of a median-voter approach are
therefore likely to be misleading.6 Second, this paper is related to re-
search on endogenous policy formation in regional economic geography
settings. Ottaviano and Thisse (2002) explores the political economy of
skilled labour mobility using a political setup where a central authority
may restrict skilled labour movements on the basis of lobbying contribu-
tions. Their outcomes indicate that no restrictions are placed on skilled
labour mobility once regions become su¢ciently integrated, which leads
to the formation of a core region of economic activity. Robert-Nicoud
and Sbergami (2004) examines the political economy of regional subsi-
dies using a probabilistic voter setup where political parties commit to
use regional subsidies in order to raise political popularity in electoral
competition. In their model, the ’ideological’ spread of voter preferences
is correlated with regional market size (through the variation of eco-
nomic activity and the corresponding dispersion of special interests) so
that voters in the small region are more easily swayed by regional sub-
sidy bene…ts. This political advantage is counteracted by the fact that
the voter population is smaller in this region, leading to an ambiguous
overall e¤ect on the small region’s relative political strength. In addi-
tion, the relative political strengths of the regions in‡uence the location
of production since regional subsidies redistribute income to the politi-
cally stronger region. Third, this paper is related to the research …eld
examining e¤ects of …rm investments on foreign trade policy formation.
Speci…cally, this strand of research formalises the producer decision to
export and/or make direct investments in a foreign market when e¤ects
on foreign policy formation is taken into account (so-called ”quid pro
quo foreign investment”).7 In our trade model, investment decisions are
made by individuals with the objective of real return maximisation. We
thereby rely on the economic geography framework in specifying linkages
between …rm movements, foreign investments and trade patterns.
6See Magee, Brock and Young (1989), Helpman (1997) and Persson and Tabellini
(2000).
7See, amongst others, Bhagwati (1987), Bhagwati et al.(1987), Dinopoulos (1989,
1992), Wong (1989) and Grossman and Helpman (1996).
4The rest of this paper is organised as follows. The next section pro-
vides a description of the underlying economic geography setting and a
characterisation of location equilibria. In section 3, the basic political
model is presented and the political equilibria are identi…ed. A conclud-
ing discussion is provided in the …nal section of the paper.
2T h e t r a d e m o d e l
A two-country model is used to represent the home country’s trade vis-
à-vis the rest of the world. The two countries share identical preferences
and technologies but may have di¤erent factor endowments. There are
two sectors, an agricultural sector in which a homogenous good (the
numeraire) is produced under constant returns to scale and perfectly
competitive market conditions and a manufacturing sector in which a
di¤erentiated good is produced under economies of scale and the Dixit-
Stiglitz (1977) form of monopolistic competition. There are two factors
of production, labour and capital. Labour is mobile across sectors and
immobile across country borders and there is international capital mo-
bility in the sense that immobile capital owners repatriate international
investment returns. Since the model is symmetric, only home country
conditions are included in the below description. Foreign country vari-
ables are denoted ¤.
There are international trade costs in the manufacturing sector while
the agricultural good is assumed to be costlessly traded for simpli…ca-
tion purposes (that will be described in the below introduction of the
numeraire sector). Trade costs are of the Samuelson iceberg form so that
a proportion of the exported quantity melts away in transit. If denoting
the total domestic trade cost level ¿,w h e r e¿ ¸ 1,t h i si m p l i e st h a ta
1=¿ fraction of foreign manufacturing exports arrive at the domestic des-
tination. This trade cost speci…cation is chosen for two reasons. First,
it introduces the relevant protection e¤ects on consumer behaviour in a
way that considerably simpli…es the analysis compared to what could be
considered alternative speci…cations.8 Second, since this is the standard
trade cost speci…cation in the economic geography framework, our policy
outcomes are consistent with the general trade and location outcomes in
the …eld.




8To our knowledge, the only contribution providing an alternative trade cost spec-
i…cation in an economic geography framework is provided by Ottaviano et al. (2002).
5where ' i sas c a l i n gf a c t o r ,M is the consumption index of man-
ufacturing varieties, A is the agricultural consumption, and ® is the
expenditure share placed on the manufacturing good. As pointed out by
Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud (2000), trade barrier revenues stand for a
negligable part of national income in rich, industrialised countries. Since
the home country in our model is industrialised with a large market size,
it is thereby reasonable to approximate the domestic income as indepen-
dent of domestic trade barrier revenues in order to simplify the policy
analysis. The manufacturing consumption index, M,i ss p e c i … e da sa










where n is the total number (mass) of domestic …rms, n¤ is the total
number (mass) of foreign …rms, mi is the consumption of variety i,a n d
¾ is the elasticity of substitution between any pair of varieties which
is inversely related to the preference for variety in consumption. The
optimal consumption of agricultural and manufacturing goods is allo-
cated by their Cobb-Douglas expenditure shares. In turn, the optimal








where h and i denotes variety types, p is the producer price of a variety
and t is a trade cost factor that takes the value t =1for domestic
varieties and t = ¿ for imported varieties. In addition, the price index








In agricultural production, the unit input requirement is normalised
to one. Since agricultural production is characterised by constant returns
to scale and perfect competition and the agricultural good is numeraire,
this implies that each agricultural worker is paid a unit wage. It is as-
sumed that each worker supplies his labour inelastically at this wage.
The agricultural good is assumed to be costlessly traded to ensure that
domestic and foreign wages are equalised when the agricultural sector
is active in each country.9 In this paper, focus is placed on two coun-
9E¤ects of allowing for trade costs on the numeraire good in the new economic ge-
ography framework are explored by Davis (1998) and Fujita, Krugman and Venables
(1999).
6tries where both sectors are active for two reasons. First, we want to
allow for internal income redistributive e¤ects of policy in identifying
policy equilibria. Second, it appears unreasonable to work with a model
setup where the rest of the world is completely specialised in one sec-
tor. Analytically, we obtain this restriction on the production pattern
by assuming that the global manufacturing sector is too small for one
country to become complete specialised in manufacturing production.10
In the manufacturing sector, it is costless to develop a new variety.
Since all varieties are demanded, each …rm therefore chooses to produce
its own variety. Firms act non-strategically in the sense that they do not
perceive that their price setting has any in‡uence on the manufacturing
price index. This assumption, which is reasonable considering the large
number of …rms, implies that each producer perceives ¾ as the elasticity
of demand for its variety.11 In producing a variety, one unit of capital
is required to cover the …xed setup costs and the variable costs are ¯
labour units per unit of output. Since one capital unit is used in the
production of each variety and each variety is produced by one …rm, the
global number of …rms equals the global capital endowment:
n + n
¤ = K + K
¤: (4)
where K is the domestic capital endowment and K¤ is the foreign
capital endowment. Since …rms face identical producer conditions in the
same location and the varieties enter symmetrically into demand, pro-
ducer prices are identical for manufacturing …rms in the same country.
Since the market for manufacturing varieties is characterised by monop-
olistic competition, a domestic producer’s …rst-order pro…t-maximising
condition equals:
p(1 ¡ 1=¾)=¯w
where p i st h ed o m e s t i cp r o d u c e rp r i c ea n dw is the domestic wage.
To simplify without loss of generality, we choose output units so that
¯ =( 1 ¡1=¾). Due to this normalisation and the unit wage, the domestic
producer price equals one. Because of the symmetry of the model, the
producer price of foreign varieties also equals one and since there are
iceberg trade costs on manufacturing varieties, the domestic market price
10This non-full specialisation condition corresponds to the analytical restriction
that the domestic and foreign expenditure, respectively, exceeds the global manufac-
turing expenditure.
11See Helpman and Krugman (1985) for a detailed exposition of the Dixit-Stiglitz
(1977) form of monopolistic competition.
7of foreign varieties equals ¿. Likewise, the foreign market price on
domestic varieties equals the foreign trade cost level, ¿¤.
Market clearing implies that the equilibrium output of a domestic









where the right-hand side terms capture the total production for the
home market and the foreign market. To simplify the policy analysis,
we follow Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud (2000) in using µ = ¿1¡¾ and
µ
¤ = ¿¤1¡¾ as measures of the domestic and foreign trade freeness levels.
Since one capital unit is required to produce a manufacturing variety,
capital market competition implies that the operating pro…ts of produc-
tion are acquired as rent on the capital investment. In turn, using the
¯ normalisation and the facts that the wage and producer price equals
unity implies that the domestic rent, r,i se q u a lt o :
r = x=¾: (6)
Capital owners maximise their real investment returns, and since for-
eign rents are costlessly repatriated, this objective is attained by nominal
rent maximisation. In the long run, capital owners are assumed to move
their investments between countries in response to a positive rent gap.
This modi…cation of the Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud (2000) model is
done to enable the identi…cation of capital ownership across location
equilibria and can be seen as reasonable considering that repatriation
costs on capital, though small, exists in reality.12 In the long run, the
nominal rent maximisation of investors implies that domestic and for-
eign rents are equalised in equilibrium. Likewise, …rms can adjust their
behaviour on the basis of pro…t-maximising incentives and alter their
location choice in the long run.
Total domestic expenditure consists of total domestic factor income:
E = L +( °r+( 1¡ °)r
¤)K (7)
where L is the domestic labour force, ° is the domestic investment
share of domestic capital owners and K is the domestic capital endow-
ment. Market clearing in the agricultural sector implies that the global
agricultural production value equals the global agricultural expenditure:
12I.e. zero repatriation costs are assumed to simplify the model setup while the
assumption that a strictly positive rent gap is required for capital movements would
be equivalent to assuming that rents are repatriated at in…nitesmall costs.
8Y + Y
¤ =( 1¡ ®)(E + E
¤): (8)









where the second factor of (9) captures the overall price e¤ect on welfare
and nG is the global number of …rms (and the global number of varieties)
and sN is the domestic …rm share. As can be seen from (9), the domes-
tic aggregate welfare is increasing in the total domestic expenditure, the
global number of varieties, the domestic …rm share and the domestic
trade openness level. Moreover, the manufacturing expenditure share
and the preference for variety in consumption ampli…es the manufactur-
ing price index e¤ect on welfare. A raised domestic expenditure level
implies that the consumer possibilities are enlarged in the home coun-
try. In addition, due to the love for variety in consumption, consumers
gain from a larger set of varieties being available for consumption. Con-
sumers also bene…t from a reduced manufacturing price index, which
may be due to a higher domestic …rm share as trade-cost inclusive prices
have to be paid for a smaller share of varieties and an enlarged domestic
level of trade freeness as this decreases the trade cost levied per unit of
imports.
A global equilibrium is characterised by (5),(6),(7),(8), and their for-
eign counterparts. The endogenous variables are the agricultural and
manufacturing variety output levels, the expenditure levels, the rents
and the number of …rms in each location while the exogenous variables
are the capital and labour endowments, the Cobb-Douglas expenditure
shares, the elasticity of substitution between varieties, and (in solving
for location equilibria) the domestic and foreign trade freeness levels. As
previously described, as short-run equilibrium may be characterised by
a rent gap while nominal rent maximisation implies that the long-run
equilibrium is characterised by an international rent equalisation.
2.1 Long-run equilibrium outcomes
The only endogenous variables depending on trade freeness levels in long-
r u ne q u i l i b r i u ma r et h en u m b e ro f… r m si ne a c hl o c a t i o n .I tc a nb es e e n
from (6) and its foreign counterpart that the long-run rent equalisation
implies that domestic and foreign …rm output levels are equal, which in
turn indicates that the production pattern is captured by the relative
…rm location. In long-run equilibrium, the domestic …rm share depends
9on the domestic expenditure share and the domestic and foreign trade
freeness levels:13
sN =
(1 ¡ 2µ + µµ
¤)
2(1 ¡ µ)(1 ¡ µ
¤)
+( sE ¡ 0:5)
(1 ¡ µµ
¤)
(1 ¡ µ)(1 ¡ µ
¤)
(10)
where sE is the domestic expenditure share and (10) is valid for 0 ·
sN · 1. The domestic …rm share is increasing in the domestic expen-
d i t u r es h a r ea n dt h ef o r e i g nt r a d ef r e e n e s sl e v e la n di sd e c r e a s i n gi n
t h ed o m e s t i ct r a d ef r e e n e s sl e v e l .T h es e c o n dt e r m ,w h i c hi sp o s i t i v ei f
t h eh o m ec o u n t r yh a st h el a r g e re x p e n d i t u r es h a r ea n dn e g a t i v eo t h e r -
wise, indicates that there is a market size advantage for manufacturing
production. This outcome is standard in the economic geography frame-
work and relies on the fact that overall demand for the manufacturing
good is larger in the larger market. If trade costs are symmetric, this
implies that the larger country is specialised in manufacturing produc-
tion. Speci…cally, sN =0 :5+( sE ¡ 0:5)(1 + µ)=(1 ¡ µ) when µ = µ
¤,s o
that the largest country’s manufacturing production exceeds that of the
smaller country with a fraction that is proportionately larger than the
market size gap between countries (this is the so-called home market
e¤ect). The domestic …rm share is larger with a higher foreign trade
freeness level as less protection is levied on domestic exports and with
a lower domestic trade freeness level as more protection is levied on for-
eign exports.14 That is, the more protected market provides a better
export base in the sense that the trade cost per unit of exports is lower
in that location. If market sizes are equal, this implies that the more
protectionist country is specialised in manufacturing production. (This
can be seen from the …rst right-hand side term, which is positive if the
home country is more protectionist and negative otherwise).
The direction and size of international capital ‡ows can be identi…ed
by the following expression:15












(sK ¡ sL) (11)
13This equation is derived using (5), (6), (7) and their foreign counterparts com-
bined with the implication that output levels are equalised.
14See Baldwin et al. (2003) for an exposition of this typical feature caused by trade
cost asymmetry in the new economic geography framework.
15This expression is obtained by …rst subtracting sK from each side of (10), and
then substituting part of the domestic expenditure share for its long-run factor en-







10where sK and sL are the domestic endowment shares of capital and
labour. Since each …rm uses one unit of capital, sN ¡ sK captures the
(possibly negative) domestic capital in‡ow as a share of the global capital
endowment. The production pattern is sustained by capital movements,
so that the domestic capital in‡ow is positively a¤ected by the domes-
tic expenditure share and the foreign trade freeness level and negatively
in‡uenced by the domestic trade freeness level. In addition, the do-
mestic in‡ow of capital depends negatively on the domestic capital to
labour endowment share di¤erence, sK ¡ sL, which e¤ectively captures
the extent to which the domestic capital/labour ratio exceeds that of
the foreign country. If the home country is relatively well endowed with
capital (labour), this places a downward (upward) pressure on the do-
mestic capital in‡ow. This e¤ect captures that local …rm sales are lower
in the country which is relatively well endowed with capital,16 which in
turn places a downward pressure on relative …rm operating pro…ts in
the country and thereby lowers the relative rent on local investments. If
market sizes and trade cost levels are symmetric, this local competition
e¤ect therefore gives rise to a capital out‡ow from the country which is
relatively well endowed with capital until rent equalisation is established
in equilibrium.
As previously described, trade-policy interactions are conditioned by
market access reciprocity, and since the most-favoured-nation rule is triv-
ially ful…lled in our two-country setting, the two main WTO regulations
governing trade-policy implementation in practice are validated by our
framework. Trade cost levels consistent with market access reciprocity
are speci…ed as yielding preset terms of trade &,w h e r e& = ¿=¿¤.I tc a n
be noted that trade cost reciprocity, which corresponds to the symmet-
ric trade cost speci…cation that is standard in the economic geography
framework, is a special case of market access reciprocity with & =1 .
3 The basic policy model
As previously described, the political setup of this paper is a modi-
…ed version of the Grossman and Helpman (1994) model in which an
incumbent government may be in‡uenced by lobbying activity. The
government acts on welfare considerations and may be a¤ected by lob-
bying contributions that can be used for political campaigns.17 It is
16This can easily be seen from E=n = wL=K +r and E¤=n¤ = wL¤=K¤ +r¤since
K=L > K¤=L¤ implies that E=n < E¤=n¤ when factor prices are equalised.
17Contributions can be used to …nance future campaigns and/or debts from pre-
vious elections. Grossman and Helpman (1994) also mention political motives of
acquiring contributions to deter electoral competition and/or establish political cred-
11assumed that the domestic lobbying group represents domestic owners
of the speci…c factor of production, capital. In turn, the objective of the
lobbying group is to maximise total member welfare net of contributions.
The government preferences are based on short-run incentives which, as
previously explained, is coherent with the large literature based on the
short-sightedness of voters. The lobbying group is also focused on short-
run consequences of policy, which is coherent with the trade model in
the sense that only short-run gains can be made from a¤ecting policy.
The political equilibrium is established in the short run, which is an
assumption is in line with results from numerous empirical endogenous
trade-policy studies showing that trade policy bene…ts factors with in-
comes tied to a particular production in the short run. In the short-run
political equilibrium, there are two main policy e¤ects on individual wel-
fare. First, there is an expenditure e¤ect based on the policy in‡uence
on individual equilibrium income. Since the unit wage is independent of
levels of trade freeness, only rental income enters into this e¤ect. Sec-
ond, there is a common policy e¤ect on the manufacturing price index
as domestic import prices are decreasing in the home country’s level of
trade freeness.
The political process takes the form of a two-stage noncooperative
game. In the …rst stage of the game, the lobbying group provides the
government with a contribution schedule mapping contribution levels to
policy positions. The lobbying group knows the government preferences
and constructs the contribution schedule (which may contain zero o¤ers
at some policy levels) while taking the anticipated government behaviour
into account. In the second stage, the government sets policy given the
contribution schedule and collects the o¤ered contribution. The prefer-
ences of policy makers incorporate the national aggregate welfare, either
on the basis of voter support or altruistic motives, and total lobbying
contributions:
ª(µ)=C (µ)+aW (µ);a > 0; (12)
where ª are the government preferences, C are the total lobbying
contributions and a is the government preference for aggregate welfare. If
a is exceeds (is below) one, policy makers place a higher (lower) value on
a dollar of voter welfare than on a dollar of lobbying contributions. From
the short-run perspective of policy makers, (9) contains two variables.
These variables are the domestic expenditure level and the domestic
level of trade freeness. Using (9) and an expenditure share equivalence
ibility.


















Since 0 · µ · 1; it can be seen from (13) that the equilibrium level
of domestic trade freeness is de…ned for a range of positive expenditure
e¤ects, indicating that policy makers want to use as extensive a protec-
tionist policy as possible when the expenditure e¤ect is below a small
threshold level and liberalise trade as much as possible when the expen-
diture e¤ect is large enough. In the intermediate range over which (13)
is de…ned, the optimal domestic trade freeness level is decreasing in the
global number of varieties, the domestic …rm share, the manufacturing
good expenditure share in consumption, the domestic expenditure share
and the global capital/labour ratio and is increasing in the magnitude of
the expenditure e¤ect and in the elasticity of substitution between man-
ufacturing varieties. It is optimal for the home country to use a more
protectionist policy when there is …ercer global competition between
…rms because of a larger number of varieties for consumers to choose
from and lower sales per …rm with a larger global capital to labour ra-
tio. Furthermore, the home country is more protectionist when there is
a …ercer domestic competition due to a larger domestic …rm share. In
addition, the domestic optimal policy is more protectionist with a higher
manufacturing expenditure share as this increases the in‡uence of the
manufacturing price index on welfare so that the domestic aggregate wel-
fare becomes more sensitive to the location of manufacturing production.
A larger domestic expenditure share also leads the home country to be
less open to trade in political equilibrium since, given that the expen-
diture e¤ect captures the in‡uence of the relative domestic market size
on factor income, a higher domestic expenditure share merely captures
that the domestic gains from trade on the basis of consumption of im-
ports is reduced. Moreover, a higher elasticity of substitution between
manufacturing varieties enhances the restrictiveness of protection and
thereby increases the optimal level of domestic trade freeness.
The policy equilibrium displays the fact that it may be optimal for a
large country to use protection. Similarly to the literature on the optimal
tari¤ argument,19 the home country’s use of protection can be motivated
18This equivalence is equal to E = sEEG, where the global long-run expenditure
equals EG = ¾
¾¡®LG.
19The optimal tari¤ argument states that it is optimal for a large country to use pro-
tection because the induced demand shift towards domestic products places a down-
13by the fact that an unilateral increase in domestic protection triggers an
overall demand shift towards domestic manufacturing varieties which in-
creases the relative domestic pro…tability of manufacturing production.
In the short-run economic geography framework, the domestic unilateral
use of protection raises the domestic rent and lowers the foreign rent. Un-
less a relatively large share of the domestic capital ownership is invested
abroad, the raised domestic rent implies a larger domestic expenditure,
which feeds onto domestic aggregate welfare. This outcome can be inter-
preted as general if considering that an extreme capital out‡ow from a
rich, industrialised country is unusual in practice. Nevertheless, the ex-
ceptional outcome in which the domestic expenditure level is negatively
a¤ected by unilateral domestic protection accentuates the fact that do-
mestic policy makers need to take policy e¤ects on foreign producer
conditions into account when domestic inhabitants make international
investments.
As previously described, the lobbying group maximises the total wel-
fare of its members net of contributions when taking into account the
anticipated political optimisation. Since the lobbying group has per-
fect information of government preferences, it designs its contribution
schedule to maximise the joint bene…t of its members and the govern-
ment. This way, the lobbying group incorporates the interdependency
between the government’s and its own objective to ensure that the do-
mestic policy choice leaves no unexploited pro…t opportunities. This
joint optimisation is characterised by the maximisation of the weighted
welfare function Wµ:
Wµ = Wo (µ)+aW (µ) (14)
where Wo is the total welfare of domestic capital owners (where the









where Eo is the total expenditure of lobbying group members. Since
the political equilibrium is characterised by the simultaneous maximisa-








ward pressure on foreign producer prices. See, amongst others, Johnson (1953/1954),
Gorman (1958), Horwell (1966), Tower (1975), Kennan and Riezman (1988), Lock-
wood and Young (2000) and Syropolous (2002).
14so that a marginal policy change at the political equilibrium leads
to an alteration in lobbying contributions that exactly o¤sets the total
welfare change of domestic capital owners. The contribution schedule is
therefore locally truthful around the equilibrium policy point, implying







Using (9) and (15) in (17) to solve for the equilibrium policy while
substituting expenditure levels for expenditure share equivalences yields
the same expression as the optimal policy in (13) with the additional
factor ((1 + a)=(Ào + a))
¾¡1 multiplied with the …rst term, where Ào is
the domestic expenditure share of politically organised inhabitants.20 It
can easily be seen that the domestic expenditure share of capital owners
is equal to one if each domestic inhabitant owns some capital. In this
case, the optimal policy coincides with the policy preferred by lobbying
group members since the special interest of capital interests is equivalent
to the general interest of the population in the home country. The lobby-
ing group therefore has no incentive to in‡uence policy makers and a zero
contribution is provided to the incumbent government in political equi-
librium. A prerequisite for lobbying activity to occur is therefore that
there is a concentration of capital owners in the population. Further-
more, the lobbying in‡uence on policy is larger, the more concentrated
are capital ownership in the population. This outcome, which is coherent
with that obtained by Grossman and Helpman (1994) in determining the
trade policy structure in a speci…c factors trade model, is due to the fact
that the deviation between the optimal policy and the policy preferred
by domestic capital interests grows as the domestic expenditure share
of lobbying group members decreases. Analytically, this outcome can
be seen from the fact that the additional factor is raised by a reduced
expenditure share of politically organised interests.
In the presence of lobbying activity, the additional factor exceeds
one so that the home country is more open to trade in political equilib-
rium. This outcome is due to the fact that individual gains from trade
are increasing in the magnitude of the individual (positive) expenditure
e¤ect. In turn, since the lobbying in‡uence is increasing in the concen-
tration of capital ownership, the equilibrium policy is more liberalised
with a smaller share of capital owners in the population. Likewise, the
home country is less open to trade in political equilibrium with a higher
20These equivalences are equal to Eo = Ào
¾
¾¡®sELG and E = ¾
¾¡®sELG .
15government preference for aggregate welfare. While the lobbying group
exerts a trade-liberalising in‡uence on policy in this case, the policy ef-
fect per unit of contribution decreases with the government preference
placed on aggregate welfare.
4 Concluding Discussion
In this paper, factors determining trade policy are identi…ed in an eco-
nomic geography framework where the international specialisation pat-
tern is sustained by international capital movements. Since an indus-
trialised country’s market size is non-negligable in this framework, its
policy choice a¤ects both its internal income distribution and foreign
producer conditions. From a national welfare perspective, it may there-
fore be optimal for the industrialised country to use protection as the
resulting expenditure shift towards production in the protected sector
goods bene…ts domestic …rms as well as the population at large.
To add a general equilibrium ‡avour to domestic policy formation,
unilateral protection levels are assumed to ful…l a market access reci-
procity rule. This condition is reasonable considering that the market
access reciprocity rule is one of the two main regulations governing trade
negotiations in the WTO. In fact, Bagwell and Staiger (1999) show that,
together with the most-favoured-nation rule that is trivially ful…lled in
our model of a country’s trade position vis-a-vis the rest of the world,
this rule provides the economic foundation of an e¢cient multilateral
trade liberalisation in the trade negotiation system. Incorporating the
market access reciprocity rule into our trade model indicates that the
domestic expenditure e¤ect is determined by a combination of relative
market sizes and the terms-of-trade stipulated by the market access reci-
procity rule. In turn, this implies that the domestic expenditure e¤ect is
negative only if the home country has a relatively small market and/or
the international policy regulation bene…ts the home country. The op-
timal domestic policy is therefore protectionist only if the home coun-
try is relatively small and/or has a policy advantage stipulated by the
market access reciprocity rule. This outcome suggests that the relation-
ship between country size and outcomes of strategic trade-policy games
identi…ed in neo-classical trade settings may be invalid in the economic
geography framework. Speci…cally, for neoclassical models, it has been
shown that the welfare gains of using protection hinges on the relative
market size of countries in the sense that only the larger trade partner
can be certain to bene…t from a ’tari¤ war’ (See Syropolous (2002)).
The optimal level of domestic trade freeness is increasing in the do-
mestic expenditure e¤ect and the preference for variety in consumption.
16Competition facing domestic …rms a¤ect the optimal domestic level of
trade freeness negatively. Speci…cally, the domestic …rm share leads to
a …ercer local competition while a larger number of global varieties and
a higher global capital to labour endowment ratio increases the inter-
national competition of domestic …rms. A larger domestic expenditure
s h a r ea l s ol e a d st h eh o m ec o u n t r yt ob el e s so p e nt ot r a d eb yr e d u c i n g
the domestic gains from trade. Since the expenditure e¤ect is negative
(positive) when the home country is relatively small (large) and/or it
has a policy advantage (disadvantage), rents on investments in domes-
tic production are raised by domestic protection (trade liberalisation) in
this case. Due to the symmetry of the model, rents on domestic and for-
eign investments are adversely a¤ected by domestic policy. This implies
that the domestic policy partly bene…ts foreign producers if domestic
inhabitants make foreign investments. In the realistic case when domes-
tic policy a¤ects the domestic rent and the domestic expenditure in the
same direction, larger countries will favour a liberalising policy stand
and smaller countries will favour protection in the sample of large, in-
dustrialised countries considered in this paper. The largest and richest
countries in the world appears to lead the trade liberalising process, at
least insofar as determining the agenda.21 In retrospective, the global
trade liberalisation that has been taking place over the last decades have
clearly occurred with these countries consent. Furthermore, the fact that
these countries constitute large markets implies that they are attractive
trading partners and therefore have a relatively larger bargaining power
compared to other countries. Whether a country’s protection level is de-
creasing in its market size amongst large, industrialised countries how-
ever remains an empirical issue to be explored by future researchers.
The lobbying group may …nd it worthwhile to in‡uence the domestic
policy position, if the domestic expenditure e¤ect is not su¢ciently small
or large for domestic special interests to coincide with the general voter
interest. In addition, lobbying activity occurs only when domestic cap-
ital ownership is concentrated in the population. As in Grossman and
Helpman (1994), the intensity of lobbying group activity is increasing
in its member share of the population. And, as naturally follows from
the fact that government preferences are equivalent with a weighted av-
erage of total lobbying member welfare and aggregate voter welfare, the
lobbying in‡uence on policy is decreasing in the government preference
for aggregate welfare. In the economic geography framework, the special
interest of capital owners can di¤er from the general interest of domes-
tic voters only if the home country is relatively large and/or it has a
21This controversial issue is f.ex. taken up in Stiglitz (2002).
17policy disadvantage. Since the lobbying group is active only if capital
interests are concentrated, and investors in domestic production bene…ts
from trade liberalisation in the case when the lobbying group’s policy
position di¤er from the optimal policy stand, the lobbying group al-
ways imposes a trade liberalising in‡uence on policy when it is active.
Though the lobbying group acts in the exclusive interest of its members,
the e¤ect of lobbying activity on policy in fact increases the domestic
long-run welfare by making the home country a more attractive loca-
tion for manufacturing production. Lobbying activity thereby leads to a
policy position which is more open to trade and creates larger long-run
gains for the population compared to a political setup in which policy
makers cannot be in‡uenced by lobbying contributions.
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